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 There have been some concerns over the existence of trade and 
investment agreements. They have been doubted because of the poverty 
and inequality issues in some regions across the globe. The rise of the 
spirit of national interest of their members has also exacerbated the 
situation. Hence, these two miserable facts may end up with a question 
whether Indonesia should keep joining trade and investment 
agreements. This article is aimed to examine if Indonesia should 
continue its participation in trade and investment agreements. 
Employing a normative legal research, this article put three parameters, 
analysing the continuity of Indonesia’s participation, namely the 
benefits of international trade and foreign direct investment, the 
rationale of trade and investment agreements, and how trade and 
investment agreements (that involve Indonesia) have positively affected 
Indonesia’s development. This article then claims that Indonesia should 
keep joining trade and investment agreements for realising its targets 
on economic growth and development. 
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1.  Introduction  
There have been some concerns, doubting the contribution of trade and investment 
agreements on the country’s economic growth and development. In the nearly half of 
world’s population, inequality and poverty are still rampant. 1  United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) in 2015 showed an inequality related to human 
development,2 especially when almost all regions achieved a medium level of human 
development, Sub Saharan Africa still faced a low-level of development.3 Muhammad 
                                                             
1   Yong-Shik Lee. “Law and Development for Least Developed Countries Theoretical Basis and Regulatory 
Framework for Microtrade”. in Yong-Shik Lee et al (eds). (2011). Law and Development Perspective on 
International Trade Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 8. 
2  United Nations Development Programme. (2015). Human Development Report 2015. Geneva: UNDP, p. 
58. 
3  Ibid. p.65. 
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Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, stated that income inequality was a murky reality, 
pointing “ninety-four percent of the world income goes to 40 percent of the population while 
sixty percent of people live on only 6 percent of world income”.4 Some scholars then express 
their concerns, arguing that trade and investment agreements have adversely affected 
environment5 and cultural value and heritage. 6 
Some leading scholars then countered above-mentioned facts by stating that the 
existence of national laws and policies has significantly determined the extent to which 
a country's success or failure to benefit from trade and investment agreements. 
Hernando De Soto (2000) claimed that formalities and inefficiencies in the legal systems 
of developing countries have made them fail to enjoy the benefits of capitalism.7 Trubek 
(2006) then identified how legal cultures of developing countries were highly ‘formalist’, 
leading to weak enforcement, inappropriate rules, and low legitimacy.8 Dee and Findlay 
(2009) then showed how national laws are more influential than international laws in 
particular areas, such as trade in services as it mainly deals with ‘behind the border’ 
issue.9 
The spirit of national interest also threatens the existence of trade and investment 
agreements, looking at their failures to conclude significant trade and investment deals.10 
Specifically, the failure of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) because of the 
unresolved disagreement between developed countries and developing countries on 
issues relating to, among other things, trade remedies and agriculture.11 Some countries’ 
domestic policies also worsen the situation. For example, some EU’s member added 
trade hindrances to cross-border mergers owing to of the distress of losing national 
vanity and jobs.12 Similarly, the new president of USA, Donald J Trump undertakes anti-
dumping measures to unilaterally condemn any countries or companies whose products 
are damaging domestic producers.13 Indonesia itself has employed several non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), such as import licenses and export restrictions despite it has successfully 
                                                             
4    Muhammad Yunus. (2006). “Nobel Lecture”. Available online from: http://nobelprize.org/ 
nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html  [Accessed November 7, 2017]. 
5    Daniel Bodansky, Jessica C Lawrence. “ Trade and Environment” in Daniel Bethlehem et al (eds.). (2009). 
The Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 508. See also I Gusti 
Ngurah Parikesit Widiatedja and I Gusti Ngurah Wairocana. (2017). “The Lack of the Environmental 
Concern in Indonesia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties”. Hasanuddin Law Review 3(3):231. 
6    Oliver R Goodenough. (1998). “Defending the Imaginary to the Death?: Free Trade, National Identity, 
and Canada’s Cultural Preoccupation”. Arizona Journal of International Law and Comparative Law 15, p. 
226. 
7    Hernando De Soto. (2000). The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs In The West and Fails 
Everywhere Else. London: Penguin Books, p. 37. 
8   David M Trubek. “The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future” in David 
Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds). (2006). The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 76. 
9    Philippa Dee and Christopher Findlay, “Services in PTAs – donuts or holes?” in Sisira Jayasuria, Donald 
MacLaren and Gary Magee. (2009). Negotiating a Preferential Trading Agreement: Issues, Constraints and 
Practical Options. Leiden: Edward Elgar, p. 97-98. 
10   I Gusti Ngurah Parikesit Widiatedja and I Gusti Ngurah Wairocana. (2017). “The Rise of the Spirit of 
National Interest and the Existence of World Trade Organization Agreement: A Case Study of 
Indonesia”. Padjajaran Journal of Law 4(2):319. 
11  BBC News. (2008). “World Trade Talks End in Collapse”. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/business/7531099.stm. [accessed November 21, 2017]. 
12  Raymond J. Ahearn. (2006). “Europe: Rising Economic Nationalism?”. CRS Report for Congress. Available 
from:  http://research.policyarchive.org/4378.pdf.  [Accessed November 11, 2017]. 
13  World Policy. (2017). “Trump and Trade Bilateralism”. Available from: http://www.worldpolicy.org/ 
blog/2017/01/12/trump-and-trade-bilateralism [Accessed  September 14,  2017]. 
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reduced its tariffs. 14  In investment agreements, some countries terminated their 
agreements, showing their lack of interest to participate in those agreements. For 
example, Indonesia had 13 Bilateral Investment treaties (BITs) that were due to expire 
during 2015 and 2016, and the government declared its measure to not renew 12 BITs 
when they expired.15 
The questionable contribution of trade and investment agreements along with the rise 
of the spirit of national interest from their member states may end up with the questions 
whether Indonesia should keep joining in trade and investment agreements.  This paper, 
however, argues that Indonesia should keep joining in trade and investment agreements 
by looking at the benefits of international trade and foreign direct investment, the 
rationale of trade and investment agreements, and how they have affected Indonesia’s 
development. 
This paper starts by explaining the theory and evidence of the benefits of international 
trade and foreign direct investments, showing how they have contributed to a country’s 
economic growth and development. This paper then turns to analyse the rationale of 
trade and investment agreements, covering how they can avoid armed conflict; how they 
have implemented non-discriminatory principle, how they have provided differential 
treatments for developing countries, and how they have a fair and independent dispute 
settlement process.  Next, this paper explains the positive impact of trade and 
investment agreements for Indonesia, focusing the impact on trade and investment 
flows, and development. 
 
2.  The Benefits of International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and 
Evidence 
2.1.  The Interplay between International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
Trade and investment are highly connected that could be illustrated as  two sides of the 
same coin.16 Companies conduct cross-border trade to supply their foreign investment,17 
and they invest abroad to bolster their trade.18 Moreover, in the liberalisation era, while 
investors produce and consume both goods and services, an open trading system will 
provide a bright investment climate. 19  Equally important, international trade and 
foreign investment have similar dominant actors through the presence of  multinational 
enterprises.20 
                                                             
14  Margit Molnar and Molly Lesher, “Indonesia” in OECD. (2008). Globalisation and Emerging Economies: 
Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa. Paris: OECD, p. 334. 
15    See Indonesia for Global Justice. (2015). “Indonesia Sudah Menghentikan 18 BITs”. Available From: 
http://igj.or.id/en/indonesia-sudah-menghentikan-18-bits/. [Accessed November 2, 2017]. 
16    Debra P Steger. “International Trade and Investment: towards a Common Regime?” in Roberto Echandi, 
Pierre Sauve (eds). (2013). Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 159. 
17    Nicholas DiMascio, Joost Pauwelyn. (2008). ”Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: 
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin”. American Journal of International Law, 102: 48. 
18   Jeswald W Salacuse. (2013). The Three Laws of International Investment: National, Contractual, and 
International Frameworks for Foreign Capital, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 23. 
19   Erik Denters, “Preferential Trade and Investment Treaties” in Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric De Brabandere 
(eds). (2012). International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations, Leiden: Martinus Nijhofff 
Publishers, p. 51. 
20    Christian Tietje, “Perspectives on the Interaction Between International Trade and Investment 
Regulation” in Roberto Echandi, Pierre Sauve (eds). (2013). Prospects in International Investment Law and 
Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.167.
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From a government perspective, when the government enacts policy, it is not purely 
designed for reaching trade or investment objectives, for example, in the case of subsidy 
program.21 In addition, the close connection of trade and investment is also reflected 
from the existing regulation that become more converged.22 Through its binding treaties, 
the WTO has applied many rules covering not only trade but also investment as reflected 
in the GATS.23 Besides, some preferential trade agreements, such as North America Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) have also 
separately regulated investment and investment arbitration.  Contrarily, trade became 
integrated into investment treaties. 24  Some existing BITs encompassing not only 
protection but also access or entry rights. 25  Besides, they also forbid trade-related 
performance requirements, especially provision to require the use of local products and 
transfer of technology.26 
 
2.2. The Benefits of International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
2.2.1. The Benefits of International Trade 
Theoretically, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations carved out how international trade 
provided benefits by explaining that: 
“If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can 
make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, 
employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general industry of the 
country . . . will not thereby be diminished, no more than the above-mentioned 
artificers; but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the 
greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage, when it is 
thus directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make.”27 
David Ricardo then denoted ‘comparative advantage’ theory in his book “On the Principles 
of Political Economy and Taxation” in 1817.28 Imagining the economy of the world only 
comprised Portugal and England with only wine and cloth were available, he then 
argued that: 
“England may be so circumstanced, that to produce the cloth may require labour of 
100 men for one year, and if she attempted to make wine, it might require the labour 
of 120 men for the same time. England would therefore find it her interest to import 
wine, and to purchase it by the exportation of cloth. To produce the wine in Portugal 
might require only the labour of 80 men for one year, and to produce the cloth in the 
same country might require the labour of 90 men for the same time. It would 
therefore be advantageous for her to export wine in exchange for cloth.”29 
                                                             
21    Debra P. Steger, Loc.Cit. 
22   Friedl Weiss, “Trade and Investment Law: What Relation?” In Giorgio Sacerdoti, et al. (eds). (2014). 
General Interest of Host State in International Investment Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.78. 
23    Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994 
(entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1B (‘General Agreement on Trade in Services’) Art I(2)(c) 
24   Joost Pauwelyn. (2014). ”The Re-Convergence of International Trade and Investment Law: Causes, 
Questions, and Reform”. (2014). American Society of International Law Proceeding, 108:255. 
25   Ibid. 
26   Ibid. 
27  Adam Smith. (1976). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, p. 478. 
28  David Ricardo. (1951). On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 135. 
29  Ibid. 
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Sketchily, according to this theory, international trade, has promised benefits by 
enabling corporations in a particular state for specializing its production, leading to 
cheaper products, and helping limited income consumers to buy a greater variation of 
those products.30 
International trade has generated significant benefits. Through the liberalised trading 
system, trade  can provide more jobs in the short term without reducing  jobs in foreign 
countries, yielding income gains in the long term.31 In addition, many firms can access a 
broader and more efficient various imported materials, skills, and technology, resulting 
in substantive productivity gains. 32  Moreover, international trade can support the 
Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’)  especially in order to alleviate poverty and 
hunger.33  In particular, imports have reduced the burden of poverty by enhancing 
competition and  enabling low-income consumers to purchase greater variety of less 
expensive goods.34 
International trade has also provided benefits to increase real GDP. It allows firms to 
specialise in the production, resulting  more cheaply products, and then creating 
country’s comparative advantages.35 Besides, trade allows firms to maximise economies 
of scale from the firms that operate overseas and have extended their market size.36 
Equally important, according to the WTO data, how international trade  considerably 
influence today’s GDP was reflected from the increase of the average share of exports 
and imports of goods and commercial services in world GDP  from 20 per cent in 1995 
to 30 per cent in 2014.37 
 
2.2.2. The Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment 
John H Dunning introduced an eclectic approach in 1977, indicating that three sources 
of advantage—namely ownership, location and internalisation—influenced a firm’s 
decision to conduct production abroad. 38  The ownership advantage referred to 
intangible factors, including intellectual property rights, entrepreneurial capacity, and 
production methods, which might enhance the competitive advantages of firms 
engaging in FDI.39 The location advantage referred to factors in a host country such as 
the availability of raw materials, the level of wages, the taxation policy and incentives 
offered by host governments.40 Finally, the internalisation advantage referred to direct 
involvement in the production process rather than a contractual partnership through 
licensing or a joint venture.41 
                                                             
30  WTO, “World Trade Report 2014 Trade and Development: Recent Trends and The Role of the WTO”, 
Loc.cit. 
31    The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2011). “The Impact of Trade 
Liberalisation on Jobs and Growth: Technical Note”. OECD Trade Policy Papers, 107: 34. 
32   Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge Kowalski, P. and M. Büge. (2013). “Assessing the Trade-Related 
Sources of Productivity Growth in Emerging Economies”. OECD Trade Policy Papers, 158: 44. 
33   World Trade Organization, (2014)‘World Trade Report 2014 Trade and Development: Recent Trends and The 
Role of the WTO’. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report14_e.pdf 
[Accessed November 12, 2017]. 
34   Ibid. 
35   Ibid. 
36   Ibid. 
37   Ibid. 
38   John H. Dunning. (1977).  The International Allocation of Economic Activity. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
p. 63.  
39   Ibid., p. 64. 
40   Ibid., p. 69. 
41   Ibid., p.107. 
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Scholars then developed the theory of outward investment based on perfect competition. 
MacDougall (1960) stated that when the free movement of capital from a home country 
to a host country took place, the marginal productivity of capital would be eventually 
equalised between the two countries.42  Feldstein and Horioka, then specified that the 
movement of capital mainly came from “capital-rich, low-interest-rate” countries to 
“higher interest rates and a lower capital stock” countries.43 This mechanism took place  
until the capital stock and interest rates had achieved equal position.44 After investing 
abroad, the home country’s output fell without any downturn in the national revenue 
because the home country gained higher revenue in the long period.45 This theory based 
on precondition that capital is identical between different sites and firms and the process 
of transferring international capital  has no barriers.46  
The presence of FDI has contributed huge benefits related to economic development for 
host countries, encompassing job opportunities, transfer of technology, productivity and 
export improvement. Firstly, FDI has created job opportunities that are crucial for 
reducing unemployment and poverty in host countries. For instance, Richards and 
Schaefer stated that foreign-owned American firms employed 6.1 million people47 and 
2.4 million indirect and induced jobs, resulting a total of 8.5 million jobs in 2013.48   
FDI has also contributed to the transfer of new and sophisticated technology that may 
accelerate and improve production and distribution methods of local firms. Specifically, 
contractual relationships between foreign and local firms through licensing, franchising, 
services outsourcing and other typical forms, creating a huge opportunity for fostering  
transfer of technology.49 In Jordan, the collaboration between foreign and local firms has 
assisted Jordanian firms to earn the competitive advantage in order  to enter 
international markets.50 
 
3.  The Rationale of Trade and Investment Agreements 
3.1.  Trade and Investment Agreements Can Mitigate Armed Conflict 
From a historical perspective, one of the reasons why the armed conflict occurred was 
the reluctance of countries to undertake trade co-operation.  Specifically, the existence of 
trade coalition, which deliberately imposed protectionist policy, exacerbated the 
conflict.51 A study from Gowa and Hicks indicated that the trade blocs during World 
                                                             
42    GDA MacDougall. (1960). “The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad: A Theoretical 
Approach’. Economic Record, 36: 25 
43   Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka. (1980). “Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows”. 
Economic Journal, 90:314-329. 
44   Ibid. 
45   GDA MacDougall, Loc.Cit. 
46   Ibid, p. 27. 
47 Julian Richards and Elizabeth Schaefer. (2016). Jobs Attributable to Foreign Direct Investment in the United 
States. Available from: http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/ 
tg_ian_005496.pdf  [accessed December 11, 2017]. 
48 Ibid. 
49   Roberto Echandi, Jana Krajcovicova, Christine Zhenwei Qiang. (2015). “The Impact of Investment Policy 
in a Changing Global Economy: A Review of the Literature”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 
7437, p.3. 
50    Zu'bi MF Al-Zu'bi et al. (2012). “Investigating the Effect of Foreign Direct Investment Technology 
Transfer on Mass Customization Capability in Jordan’s Manufacturing Sector”. International Research 
Journal of  Finance and Economics, 94:84. 
51   Joanne Gowa and Raymond Hicks. (2013). “Politics, Institutions and Trade: Lessons of the Interwar Era”. 
International Organization, 67:440. 
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War I and the Great Depression triggered high political tension among countries, leading 
to World War II.52  Learning from this experience, a country that apply  trade openness 
instead of trade blocs will have a greater opportunity to forestall and resolve conflict 
within their borders.53 
The existence of trade and investment agreements is important to reach world’s peace 
and stability. When governments concluded agreements, it was not only to reach 
economic prosperity but also security. 54  For instance, one of the objectives of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 1967 is to “promote regional peace and 
stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among 
countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.”55  Besides, 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the 
European Union recognises “the importance of international security, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law for the development of international trade and economic cooperation.”56 
Trade and investment agreements can mitigate conflict and reduce the risk of a 
militarised action although these issues  are not always expressly stated in treaties’ 
objectives.57  In particular, a study from Lee and Pyun stated that an increase in bilateral 
trade interdependence and global trade integration significantly promotes peace 
between countries from 1950 to 2000.58 Beyene also supported this argument, showing 
how bilateral trade relationship  significantly minimise the probability of violence in East 
Africa.59 
Similar to trade, the co-operation among countries to promote and protect FDI will 
contribute to the more peaceful situation although this issue is not always expressly 
stated in investment agreements.  The presence of FDI has a positive impact in boosting 
economic development,60 whereby reducing the likelihood of armed conflict. Polachek 
and Xiang scrutinised the connection of FDI and conflict as the growth of FDI, to some 
extent, exceeded international trade.61 They revealed that the presence of FDI has ‘a 
                                                             
52    Ibid. 
53   Robert G Blanton and Clair Apodaca. (2007). “Economic Globalization and Violent Civil Conflict: Is 
Openness a Pathway to Peace?” The Social Science Journal, 44:605. 
54   Yoram Z Haftel, “Trade Agreements, Violent Conflict and Security” in Andreas Dur, Manfred Elsig 
(eds). (2015). Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.313 
55   The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), The ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1967. Availble 
from: http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967 [Accessed 
January 19, 2018]. 
56    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the 
European Union and its member states, signed 26 September,2014, the Preamble. 
57   Edward D Mansfield, “Preferential Peace: Why Preferential Trade Arrangements Inhibit Inter-state 
Conflict” in Edward D Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins (eds). (2003). Economic Interdependence and 
International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate. Michigan:University of Michigan Press, p. 
223. 
58   Jong-Wha Lee and Ju Hyun Pyun, (2009). “Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace’.Working Paper 
Series on Regional Economic Integration No.24, Asian Development Bank,  p. 3. 
59   Hailay Gebretinsae Beyene. (2015). ”Does International Trade Reduce Political Disputes?”. Foreign Trade 
Review, 50: 114. 
60   Laura Alfaro et al. (2004). “FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets”. Journal of 
International Economics, 64:93 
61   Solomon Polachek and Jun Xiang. (2010).  “How  Opportunity  Costs Decrease the Probability of War in 
an Incomplete Information Game”. International Organization, 64:133. 
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pacifying effect’ to mitigate international conflict.62 A study from Bussmann supported 
this argument, indicating that FDI reduce ‘the risk of an outbreak of a fatal dispute’.63 
 
3.2.  Trade and Investment Agreements Implement Non-Discriminatory Principle 
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, many countries undertook discriminatory 
trade policies, leading to economic and political crises.64 This situation became one of the 
major contributing factors of the World War II.65  Thus, the existence of the trade and 
investment treaties that implement non-discriminatory principle is very crucial for 
managing trade relations among countries.  The preamble of the WTO mentioned that 
the core objective of the multilateral trading system is “the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international trade relations.” 66  
To illustrate the objective of the non-discriminatory principle, the Appellate Body in EC 
– Banana III ruled that: 
“The essence of the non-discrimination obligation is that like products should be treated 
equally, irrespective of their origin. As no participant disputes that all bananas are like 
products, the non-discrimination provision apply to all imports of bananas, irrespective 
of whether and how a Member categorises or subdivides these imports for administrative 
or other reasons.”67 
Supporting the provision from the GATT, Article 2.3 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) expressly mentioned that: 
“Each Party shall accord national treatment to the goods of the other Parties in 
accordance with Article III of GATT 1994, including its interpretative notes, and to 
this end, Article III of GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes are incorporated into and 
made part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis”.68 
The implementation of the non-discriminatory principle has also covered bilateral 
investment treaties. In paticular, article 3 (1) of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
2012 requires ‘national treatment’ as follows: 
“Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or 
other disposition of investments in its territory.”69 
 
 
                                                             
62    Ibid. 
63   Margit Bussmann. (2010). “Foreign Direct Investment and Militarized International Conflict”. Journal of 
Peace Research, 47(2): 143. 
64   Peter Van Den Bossche. (2010). The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 321. 
65    Ibid. 
66   Andrew D Mitchell and Nicolas JS Lockhart. “Ensuring Compliance between a Bilateral PTA and the 
WTO” in Sisira Jayasuria, Donald MacLaren and Gary Magee (eds). (2009). Negotiating a Preferential 
Trading Agreement: Issues, Constraints and Practical Options. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p.235. 
67   Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R (25 September 1997) Para 190. 
68    Trans-Pacific Partnership. (opened for signature 5 November 2015, not yet entered into force) art. 2.3. 
69    The United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2012, art 3 (1). 
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Almost all Indonesia’s BITs provides non-discriminatory principle. For example, 
Indonesia-Malaysia BIT in 1994 explains that: 
“Investments made by investors of either Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party and/or returns accrued, shall receive treatment which is fair and 
equitable, and not less favourable than that accorded to any third State.” 70 
 
3.3.  Trade and Investment Agreements Have Special and Differential Treatments for 
Developing Countries 
The importance of trade and investment agreements is also related to the application of 
special and differential treatment for developing countries, recognising the specific 
needs to pursue their economic development. The Preamble of WTO then emphasize in 
its preamble that recognise: 
“...there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international 
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”71 
One of the provisions that provide special and differential treatment is found under 
Article XXXVI (8) of the GATT. It stated that “The developed contracting parties do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and 
other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.”72 
The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) also consider the 
importance of  the special and differential treatment for developing countries. Its 
preamble stated that:  
“Considering the different levels of development among ASEAN Member States and 
between ASEAN Member States, Australia and New Zealand and the need for 
flexibility, including special and differential treatment, especially for the newer ASEAN 
Member States; as well as the need to facilitate the increasing participation of newer 
ASEAN Member States in this Agreement and the expansion of their exports, 
including, inter alia, through strengthening of their domestic capacity, efficiency and 
competitiveness.”73 
In 1988, Indonesia involved in what have been called Global System of Trade Preference 
(GSTP) under the framework of UNCTAD, consisting of 77 developing countries.74 The 
objective of this agreement was ‘to promote and sustain mutual trade, and the 
development of economic co-operation among developing countries, through exchange 
of concessions’.75  
Because special and differential treatments for developing countries take many forms, 
Van Den Bossche then divided these treatments into six types: the provision to enhance 
the trade opportunities of developing countries; the provision regulating developed 
                                                             
70    Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia, signed 22 
January 1994 (terminated) art 3 (‘Indonesia-Malaysia BIT’). 
71    Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Preamble. 
72    GATT. Art. XXXVI (8) 
73    Agreement establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (‘AANZFTA’), signed 27 
February 2009, the Preamble. 
74    Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries, signed 13 April 1988 
(entered into force 22 October 1989) the preamble. 
75    Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries, signed 13 April 1988 
(entered into force 22 October 1989) art 2. 
P-ISSN: 2442-9880, E-ISSN: 2442-9899 
10 
 
countries to safeguard developing countries’ interest; the flexible commitments, of 
action and employ of policy tools; interposed time periods; technical assistance; and the 
least developed countries’ regulation.76 
 
3.4.  Trade and Investment Agreements Have A Fair Enforcement Mechanism 
3.4.1. Trade agreements have established rules-oriented dispute settlement 
Although international courts may not be able to force governments to obey their 
decisions, 77  dispute settlement mechanism has a crucial role for enforcing the 
commitments made under trade agreements.78 Without having this process, any trade 
agreements would not have been concluded.79  Matsushita stated that trade agreements 
entail trade rules and enforcement in the sense that a trade agreement alone would not 
be inadequate to prevent and abolish the tendency of states to diverge from or to negate 
market access commitments.80  
Some trade treaties, such as WTO and NAFTA, have provided more rules-oriented 
dispute settlement process through the application of judicial settlement and arbitration 
(not just diplomatic means).81 This method promises a just and fair solution, putting all 
members in the equal position. 82  For example, developing countries successfully 
defeated superpower countries in some WTO cases. In particular, US – Underwear, a 
complaint by Costa Rica,83 US — Clove Cigarettes,84 a complaint by Indonesia and even 
more so US – Gambling, a complaint by Antigua which has a population only 67,000.85   
The next rationales for trade agreements is that the freedom to manage court proceeding. 
Under WTO and PTAs adjudication process, courts and tribunals entitle what have been 
regarded as ‘inherent powers’,86 including  ‘the power to manage the  proceedings to the 
extent necessary to fulfil their adjudicative function’.87 Having obtained these rights, 
courts and tribunals could freely consider what evidence to concede and how to weigh 
that evidence 88  thereby enabling them to decide more accurate and rules-oriented 
rulings. Equally, trade agreements provide a direct mechanism for member by which it 
                                                             
76   Peter Van Den Bossche, op.,cit., p.737. 
77   Karen J Alter. (2014). The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, p. 32. 
78    World Trade Organisation Secretariat. (2007). World Trade Report 2007: Six Decades of Multilateral Co-
operation – What Have We Learned?. Geneva: WTO, p. 155. 
79   Ibid. 
80   Mitsuo Matsushita et al. (2003).  The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 3rd ed, p.8. 
81    J.G Merrills. (2011). International Dispute Settlement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 5th ed, p. 83. 
82    Hanspeter Neuhold. (2015). The Law of International Conflict: Force, Intervention and Peaceful Dispute 
Settlement. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, p. 203. 
83    Appellate Body Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, 
WT/DS24/AB/R (25 February 1997)  [11]  (‘US-Underwear’). 
84   Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 
WT/DS406/AB/R (24 April 2012) [5751] (‘US- Clove Cigarettes’). 
85    Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (20 April 2005) [5663]  (‘US-Gambling’). 
86   Andrew Mitchell and David Heaton. (2010). “The Inherent Jurisdiction of WTO Tribunals: The Select 
Application of Public International Law Required by the Judicial Function”. Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 31: 561. 
87    Michelle Grando. (2009). Evidence, Proof and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute Settlement. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 54 
88   Tania Voon. (2015). “Evidentiary Challenges for Public Health Regulation in International Trade and 
Investment Law”. Journal of International Economic Law, 18:800.  
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can file lawsuit to another member without any prior consent. Specifically, under the 
WTO dispute settlement scheme, whenever a member wants to submit a complaint 
against another WTO member,  it can request the WTO’s dispute settlement, without 
requiring the defending party’s consent.89 This process is hugely different from common 
international courts proceeding wherein states can only be sued before an international 
court if they have agreed to the jurisdiction of that court or tribunal.90      
Under dispute settlement process, Indonesia has actively involved in the WTO cases. 
Since 1998 Indonesia has been a respondent for 10 cases, a complainant for 10 cases and 
a third party for around 17 cases.91  The following table shows how Indonesia has 
involved in the WTO case. 
 
3.4.2.  Investment Agreements Have Provided Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
The existence of international dispute settlement will significantly determine the 
decision to invest abroad. Besides economic aspects, an investor will carefully calculate 
the level of risk in a particular country.92 Specifically, without having provided stable 
and predictable law, an investor would be a subject to arbitrary, unpredictable, or 
otherwise unfair measures, such as unfair factory expropriation and heavy regulatory 
burdens.93 Moreover, in particular developing countries, government can be labile or 
corrupt and the ‘rule of law’ may not be properly implemented.94 On these grounds, 
although  a host country  has regulated  dispute settlement procedures and remedies,95 
they would not be sufficient to resolve investor’s dispute with the host country.96 
The presence of the ISDS under investment treaties denoted a considerable shift under 
international investment law discourse through the recognition of  non-state actors.97 In 
the past, under the diplomatic protection scheme, an investor could only sue the host 
state who assumed breach of commitment through one’s home state that take action on 
one’s behalf.98 Through the ISDS, an investor could hold host state responsibility for any 
violation of their international obligation without depending on the intervention 
investor’s home state.99  
 
                                                             
89   David Unterhalter. “What Makes the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure Particular: Lessons to be 
Learned for the Settlement of International Disputes in General?” in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Ina 
Gätzschmann (eds). (2013). International Dispute Settlement:Room for Innovations?. New York: Springer, p. 
6. 
90    Ibid. 
91  World Trade Organisation, Dispute Settlement: Disputes by country/territory. Available from: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm [Accessed December 7, 2017]. 
92   Stephan W. Schill, “Private Enforcement of International Investment Law: Why We Need Investor 
Standing in BIT Dispute Settlement” in Michael Waibel, et al (eds). (2010).  The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration. South Holland: Kluwer, p. 31. 
93   Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes. (2013). Economic Foundations of International Law. Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, p. 288. 
94   Ibid. 
95   Peter Muchlinski, “Policy Issues” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer (eds). 
(2008). The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law. Oxford: Oxord University Press, p. 41. 
96   Ibid. 
97   Jeswald Salacuse. (2010). The Law of Investment Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11  
98   Ibid. 
99  Stephan W Schill, “Private Enforcement of International Investment Law: Why We Need Investor 
Standing in BIT Dispute Settlement” in Michael Waibel, Asha Kausal et al. (2010).  The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration. South Holland: Kluwer, p. 30. 
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The next rationales relating to how ISDS grant an investor what have been called as 
‘direct rights theory’ wherein the substantive rights of an investor ‘belong to the claimant 
investor itself ’ instead of investor’s home state.100 ‘Direct rights theory’ cover investor’s 
ability to gain a successful claim although one’s home state assumed that the court had 
no strong jurisdiction.101 Also, an investor could waive one right to undertake a claim. 
102  Under this theory, there is no a compulsory requirement for an investor to exhaust 
domestic remedies prior to submitting a claim. 103  Moreover, in the calculation of 
compensation, this process only considers the injury of an investor itself and not an 
investor’s home state.104 
 
4.  Evidence of the Impact of Trade and Investment Agreements in Indonesia 
4.1.  Impact on Trade and Investment Flows 
In practice, some empirical data show how trade agreements have increased trade flows. 
Chirathivat (2002) simulated the impact of liberalisation of tariff and non-tariff ASEAN-
China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) separately. 105  The study revealed that tariff 
liberalisation led to an increase of ASEAN exports to China by 53 per cent, while China’s 
exports to ASEAN would increase by 23 per cent.106  Non-tariff liberalisation would 
increase ASEAN exports to China amounted to 187 per cent and Chinese exports to 
ASEAN by 34 per cent. 107  Diermen, Basri and Sahan (2011) analysed how ACFTA 
increased each country’s exports to the other up to 70 per cent.108 The highest increase of 
export was machinery and transport equipment sectors in China, and agricultural and 
mineral sectors in Indonesia.109  
In 2012, the Fiscal Policy Agency (‘FPA’) of the Ministry of Finance of Indonesia analysed 
the impact of regional trade agreements that involved Indonesia.110 ASEAN- Korea FTA 
would expedite trade between ASEAN and Korea wherein Indonesia and Malaysia 
would benefit nearly half of the growth of trade between ASEAN and Korea.111  In 
Indonesia-Japan FTA, this study analysed if the exports of Indonesia to Japan increased 
approximately 5.23 per cent, meaning an increase of 1.58 times more than if Indonesia 
did not join Indonesia-Japan FTA. 112  As regards to ASEAN-India FTA, this study 
pointed out Indonesia’s export commodities, such as vegetable oil and fats, motor 
vehicles and parts, forestry, fruit, nuts had increased above 10 per cent during 2010-
2011.113   
                                                             
100   Jeswald Salacuse, loc.cit. 
101  Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell and James Munro. (2014). “Parting Ways: The Impact of Mutual 
Termination of Investment Treaties on Investor Rights”. ICSID Review, 29:455. 
102   Ibid. 
103   Ibid. 
104   Ibid. 
105  Suthipand Chirathivat. (2002). ”ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: Background, Implications and Future 
Development”. Journal of Asian Economics,13:680. 
106  Ibid. 
107  Ibid. 
108  Peter van Diermen, M Chatib Basri and Erinch Sahan. (2011). “Trade, Aid & Development in Indonesia: 
A discussion paper”. Prepared for AusAID-Indonesia Program, p. 1. 
109  Ibid., p. 31. 
110  Badan Kebijakan Fiskal. (2012). Free Trade Agreement (FTA) & Economic Partnership Agreement(EPA), dan 
Pengaruhnya terhadap Arus Perdagangan dan Investasi dengan Negara Mitra. Jakarta: Kementerian 
Keuangan, p. 3. 
111  Ibid., p. 22. 
112  Ibid., p. 43. 
113  Ibid., p.94. 
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Although increasing trade flows, some empirical data have expressed some concerns.  
Salidjanova and Iacob Koch-Weser (2015) examined China’s relative significance for 
individual ASEAN countries.114 For trade balance, Indonesia has been experiencing a 
trade deficit with China since 2007. 115  Specifically, China’s import to Indonesia 
consistently increased from over $4 billion in 2003 to $12.6 billion in 2007, and increased 
to nearly $37 billion in 2013.116 Kustiari and Hermanto (2016) then assessed the potential 
impacts of Indonesia-India FTA on the agricultural sector.117 Only vegetable, fruit and 
vegetable oil have shown an increase on export.118 
According to Data from the Ministry of Trade (2016), Indonesia has a trade surplus with 
the following trade agreements’ partners: Cambodia (15,05 per cent), Vietnam (6,47), Lao 
(4,40), New Zealand (0,97), and Philippines (0,41). However, Indonesia has experienced 
a trade deficit with its partners, including Korea (-12,98 per cent), Japan (-12,51), 
Singapore (-7,43), Malaysia (-6,71), Thailand (-5), India (-4,25), Australia (-4,20) and 
China (-2,54).119  
With respect to investment flows, Thangavelu and Findlay (2011) assessed whether 
PTAs have a differential impact on FDI flows in the Asia-Pacific region.120 The empirical 
results pointed out a positive connection between participation in ASEAN FTA and FDI 
inflows into the Southeast Asian region. 121  The increase of FDI inflows then also 
determined by the treatment of investment, especially sectoral barriers to investment in 
manufacturing and services sectors.122 Diermen, Basri and Sahan (2011) then predicted 
that Indonesia-Australia FTA would increase FDI flows by 0.91 per cent in Indonesia’s 
mineral and energy sector.123 Next, Wignaraja (2013) analysed that AFTA has increased 
FDI by 36 per cent in Indonesia.124 
OECD (2010) revealed the enormous gap across regions within Indonesia in relation to 
FDI inflows.125 Java collected 60 per cent of FDI projects on an approval basis from 1992 
to 2006.126 Sumatra was the second most attractive region for foreign investors, collecting 
21 per cent of total FDI with the majority projects had been in the province of Riau.127 
                                                             
114  Nargiza Salidjanova and Iacob Koch-Weser. (2015). “China’s Economic Ties with ASEAN: A Country-
by-Country Analysis”. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Staff Research Report, 
p. 3. 
115  Ibid., p. 17. 
116  Ibid., p. 18. 
117  Reni Kustiari and Hermanto. (2016). “The Impact of the Indonesia-India Free Trade Agreements: a CGE 
Analysis”. Paper Presented at the 15th International Convention of the East Asian Economic Association: 
Sustainable and Inclusive Development in Asia and the Global Economy, 5-6 November 2016, Bandung, 
p.3. 
118  Ibid. 
119  Ministry of Trade, Balance of Trade With Trade Partner Country: Period 2011-2016. Available from: 
http://www.kemendag.go.id/en/economic-profile/indonesia-export-import/balance-of-trade-with-trade-partner-
country?negara=122  [Accessed January 4, 2018]. 
120  Shandre M. Thangavelu and Christopher Findlay, “The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Foreign 
Direct Investment in the Asia-Pasific Region” in Christopher Findlay (ed.) (2011). ASEAN+1 FTAs and 
Global Value Chains in East Asia. Jakarta: ERIA, p.115. 
121  Ibid., p. 124. 
122  Ibid. 
123  Peter van Diermen, M Chatib Basri and Erinch Sahan, op.cit.,p. 32. 
124  Ganeshan Wignaraja. (2013). “Regional Trade Agreements and Enterprises in Southeast Asia”. Asian 
Development Bank Institute Working Paper 442, p. 10. 
125  Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010). OECD Investment Policy Reviews 
Indonesia 2010. Paris: OECD, p. 58. 
126  Ibid. 
127  Ibid. 
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From 2006, 85 per cent of the total FDI project was in Java, especially in the Jakarta 
Capital Region.128 Next, Sumatra has collected 11 per cent of total FDI projects that nearly 
half of investment has gone to Riau.129 
 
4.2.  Impact on Development 
Some studies have identified how trade agreements have reduced poverty. First, 
Robilliard and Park et al (2008) explained how ASEAN-China FTA would benefit 
Indonesia through greater competition, lower consumer prices, and increased 
productivity.130 Similarly, Center of International Economics (2012) estimated Indonesia-
Australia FTA would also reduce poverty although its impact was likely to be varied 
depending on location and industry sector. 131 A study from the Ministry of Trade of 
Indonesia (2011) showed how a trade agreement increased a competitiveness of 
Indonesian products.132 By using Constant Market Share Analysis (‘CMSA’), this study 
examined the competitiveness of Indonesian manufacturing products after the 
implementation of Indonesia- Japan FTA. 133  The result revealed the increase of 
competitiveness in the following products: fish products, cocoa, garments, and 
furniture. 134  Nevertheless, the competitiveness of shrimp and plastic products has 
decreased after the implementation of this bilateral agreement.135 
Some empirical data also revealed some concerns. Robilliard and Robinson (2006) 
admitted although the data on poverty reduction were positive in relation to the number 
of people move out from poverty, the overall impact of trade liberalisation could not be 
positive as this study neglected the cost of temporary unemployment caused by 
displaced workers in some sectors.136 ILO (2013) then revealed that high unemployment 
still took place in Indonesia, particularly among women, the educated workforce and 
youth, reflecting the benefits of trade liberalisation have not been equal among age, 
gender and groups.137 
As regards to FDI, some empirical data showed its significant benefit for development. 
Robertson (2009) examined the role of FDI and the working conditions in Indonesia, 
covering income, facilities, safety, transportation, and medical benefits.138  The result 
pointed out that the foreign-owned companies provided higher working conditions than 
local companies.139 Similarly, Lipsey and Sjöholm (2010) explained that foreign-owned 
                                                             
128  Ibid. 
129  Ibid. 
130  Donghyun Park, et al. (2008). “Prospects of an ASEAN–People’s Republic of China Free Trade Area: A 
Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis”. ADB Economics Working Paper Series 130, p. 17. 
131  Centre for International Economics, op.cit., p. 33-34. 
132  Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia. (2011). Kajian Dampak Kesepakatan Perdagangan Bebas 
terhadap Daya Saing Produk Manufaktur Indonesia. Jakarta:Kemdag, p. 186-187. 
133  Ibid. 
134  Ibid. 
135  Ibid. 
136  Anne-Sophie Robilliard and Sherman Robinson, “The Social Impact of a WTO Agreement in Indonesia” 
in Thomas W Hertel and L Alan Winters (eds). (2006). Poverty and the WTO : Impacts of the Doha 
Development Agenda. Geneva: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World 
Bank,  p. 320. 
137  International Labour Organisation. (2013). Trade and Employment: Country Report for Indonesia. Geneva: 
ILO, p. ix. 
138  Raymond Robertson et al, “Globalization and Working Conditions: Evidence from Indonesia” in 
Raymond Robertson et al (eds). (2009). Globalization, Wages, and the Quality of Jobs: Five Country Studies. 
Geneva: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, p. 232. 
139  Ibid. 
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companies and foreign acquisitions in manufacturing plants have paid higher wages 
than domestic companies. 140  OECD (2010) then denoted how FDI projects have 
generated much more employment.141 From 2006 to 2008, new FDI projects provided  
645000 jobs, that was equal to 7 per cent of the increase in total employment.142 
 
5.  Conclusion 
It has to be admitted that the existence of trade and investment agreements has been 
doubted due to the unequal development and poverty in some states across the globe. 
The rise of the spirit of national interest that has been reflected through the increase of 
trade barriers and the termination of agreements worsen the situation. Although these 
two depressed facts, Indonesia should keep its participation in trade and investment 
agreements, especially to realise its targets in economic growth and development. 
Looking at the theory and evidence of international trade and foreign direct investment, 
they have provided significant benefits, covering, the increase of jobs, less expensive 
products, transfer of technology, transfer of skills, the alleviation of poverty, GDP’s 
increase. There have been four rationales of trade and investment agreements. Firstly, 
trade and investment agreements can avoid armed conflict; they have implemented non-
discriminatory principles; they have provided special and differential treatments for 
developing countries, and they have a fair and independent dispute settlement 
mechanism. Analysing the trade and investment agreements that involve Indonesia, 
they have positively affected trade and investment flows and development in Indonesia. 
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